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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to draw lessons for the New Economy from what economists know about 
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resolving the so-called productivity paradox. 
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Nontechnical Summary
Because the New Economy is so intertwined with Information and
Communications Technology, we are primed to think of New Economy
developments as nothing more than technology-driven, productivity-
improving changes on the supply side. We then want New Economy
developments to do what all technical progress has historically done.
And we emerge disappointed when we ﬁnd productivity has not sky-
rocketed, inﬂation has not forever disappeared, business downturns
have not permanently vanished, and ﬁnancial markets have not re-
mained stratospheric.
This paper argues that the most profound changes in the New
Economy are not productivity or supply-side improvements, but in-
stead consumption or demand side changes. The paper summarizes
the case for the importance of technical progress in economic growth,
argues why the New Economy diﬀers, and draws lessons from eco-
nomic history to highlight potential pitfalls and dangers as the New
Economy continues to evolve.
A technical appendix studies the role of human capital in eco-
nomic growth, clarifying when human capital inﬂuences levels of in-
come but not growth rates and when human capital inﬂuences growth
rates. The discussion emphasizes the distinction between human cap-
ital used for improving technology and human capital used in produc-
ing goods and services. Both matter and each separately can inﬂuence
growth in an economy.
The key lesson for the New Economy is that endogenous growth
results from the interaction of demand and supply characteristics, not
just production-side developments.
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Pick up a newspaper today, and you have to realize how words and
concepts that didn’t even exist a decade ago—Internet browsers, desk-
top operating systems, Open Source Software, WAP delivery, the 3
billion letters of the human genome, political organization and mobi-
lization by Internet chat rooms—now appear regularly in front page
headlines. These headlines describe news items—not science ﬁction
trends, not arcane academic technologies, not obscure scientiﬁc ex-
periments.
Someone out there with a handle on the social zeitgeist has deter-
mined that these items—part of the New Economy—impact readers’
lives. Evidently, they are right, for these ideas subsequently insinuate
their way into hundreds of thousands of non-specialist but informed
discussions. When did popular culture evolve to where relative merits
of diﬀerent Internet browsers can be quietly debated at dinner (some-
times not so quietly), or where personal aﬃnity for diﬀerent desktop
operating systems can constitute a basis for liking or disliking some-
one [Stephenson, 1999]?
When you live in that world, it is puzzling when you meet people
intent on proving to you that none of those things you think you
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see and experience is real. These people, many of them academic
economists, seem to come from an alternate, orthogonal universe.
They say the New Economy is as nothing compared to the truly great
inventions of the past (surely a strawman hypothesis if ever one was
needed). These skeptics show you charts and ﬁgures, bristling with
numerical calculations, arguing that the changes you ﬁgured to be
deep and fundamental apply, in reality, only to the miniscule group
of people working in companies that manufacture computers.
Are academic economists undermining their own credibility and
doing their profession a disservice, when they argue a case so ridicu-
lously opposite to what others think is plain and obvious? Or, are
they providing a needed reality check as rampant hyperbole takes
over all else?
Either way, a tension has built up between two groups of observers
on the New Economy. In this paper, I seek to describe how such a
situation might have come about, and I want to suggest some possible
ways to understand and resolve that tension.
1.1 Technologies and Consumers
Anyone who visits urban centers in the Far East and South East Asia
notices immediately the extreme, in-your-face nature to modern tech-
nologies here. Advanced technological products are sold, incongru-
ously, in grubby marketplaces. Sophisticated software and hardware
change hands in crowded stores that seem better suited to trading
fresh homegrown agricultural produce.
To be clear, it’s not that the nature of the underlying technolo-
gies diﬀers between here and the rest of the world. It’s that modern
Asia uses modern technology more visibly, forging a sharper, more
direct link between that technology and ordinary consumers. Inter-
net cafes were invented in Thailand, and proliferated widely in Asia
early on. Next-generation wireless mobile applications in Japan have
been among the most innovative worldwide, and are globally admired
and imitated. Urban center road pricing and seaport management in
Singapore have attained timesliced precision that are orders of mag-
nitudes better than anywhere else in the world. In many East Asian
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states, the Internet is a critical source of information, shortcircuiting
barriers in a way that nothing else can. Hong Kong has cash card
transactions rates unmatched elsewhere. In city squares throughout
the Far East, up-to-the-second, streaming information screams out in
high-tech high deﬁnition at throngs of ordinary shoppers. Digital en-
tertainment imaging and animation here are unparalleled: East Asia
continues to make the best toys in the world, high-tech or otherwise.
This technology/ﬁnal consumer linkage is, of course, not unique in
the world. Nokia Corporation in Helsinki has gotten to be the world’s
leading mobile telecommunications company by focusing on exactly
this, delivering leading-edge technology directly (and literally) into
the hands of hundreds of millions of consumers worldwide.
But, if not unique, this linkage is not particularly commonplace ei-
ther. Take that example of Finnish wireless banking, mobile telecom-
munications, and information dissemination applications. In the eyes
of some, when compared to daily life in Helsinki, consumer usage of
technology in Silicon Valley is akin to that of a relatively backward
Third World country. Perhaps so too, when compared to Hong Kong
and other parts of Asia.
1.2 Accumulating capital under Joseph Stalin
In 1994, Paul Krugman [1994] suggested that because Singapore ap-
peared to have developed primarily by heavily accumulating physical
capital, its high economic growth rate could not be sustainable—the
same way that Joseph Stalin’s program for economic growth, em-
bodied in exhorting Soviet steel production to match the US, was
ultimately bound to fail.
In this interpretation, Krugman used the economists’ prediction
that ongoing physical capital accumulation—other things equal—
would eventually run into diminishing returns. Putting into oper-
ation big machines, steel factories, bridges and other physical in-
frastructure, and heavy machinery can contribute to growth only
temporarily—and then only in a relatively minor way.
But if not physical capital, then what drives economic perfor-
mance? Many economists now agree that technical progress and
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its close relative, technology dissemination, constitute the ultimate
source of sustained economic growth. That is the position I take in
this paper.
But if that view is held almost uniformly, its connection to the
New Economy is not as obviously uncontroversial. Economists such
as Robert Gordon [2000] have been delightedly skeptical on the contri-
bution of the New Economy to economic performance. To caricature
those views, the New Economy has been a scam, foisted on an un-
suspecting public and naive, trend-chasing policy-makers by the New
Economy’s slick sales and public relations machine.
1.3 Shopping the Internet
Towards the end of 2000, I got to have breakfast with a successful
multimillionaire Internet entrepreneur in London. I asked him if he
thought, as some seemed to, that Internet developments amounted to
a new Industrial Revolution. He replied, “We’re just talking about
selling more groceries through a big out-of-town shopping centre—
how revolutionary is that?”
My entrepreneur acquaintance—for the record, not an Internet
grocer—has a self-aware, tongue-in-cheek manner about him. His
statement is pithy to an extreme on the New Economy. It displays
the same focus on the technology/consumer linkage I described above.
The statement is, in my view, spot on, mostly, but it is a little too
ﬂippant on what is new in the New Economy.
This paper attempts to show why the technology/consumer link-
age is critical in the New Economy—against a background of what
economists know about economic growth and technology, and about
the importance of technology’s dissemination over time and across
economies. It is here where the New Economy is truly new (well,
almost)—and where it diverges most sharply from conventional mech-
anisms relating technology and economic growth.
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2 Technology in Economic Growth: Knowledge and
Economic Performance
From early on, economists studying growth had found that capital
accumulation accounted for only 13% of the improvement in economic
welfare experienced over the ﬁrst part of the 20th century [Solow,
1957]. The rest of economic progress—almost 90% of it—had to be
attributed to technology, or total factor productivity (TFP). Recent
empirical analyses, notably Feyrer [2001], document how yet other
key features of patterns of cross-country development similarly hinge
importantly on TFP.
Those early conclusions followed from the so-called neoclassical
growth model (see, e.g., Solow [1956, 1957] or the Technical Appendix,
Section 7, below). But the key policy implication that many took
from this work was exactly opposite to what the research showed—at
least as I am interpreting it. In the 1960s and 1970s, researchers and
policy-makers read Solow’s work on the neoclassical growth model
to mean that physical capital accumulation was what mattered most
for economic growth. The reason, perhaps, is that, on the theoreti-
cal side, neoclassical growth analysis focused on the economic incen-
tives surrounding decisions to save and invest in physical capital; it
was downplayed that empirical analysis showed instead technology or
TFP accounting for a much greater eﬀect on economic performance
and growth.
(Some authors still now take TFP to be no more than a residual,
whereupon many possibilities remain open for its interpretation and
explanation—it might be political barriers, monopoly ineﬃciency, X-
eﬃciency, political economy ineﬃciency, moral hazard, social capital,
and so on. In this paper, I adopt principally the discipline of the neo-
classical growth model, and identify TFP with only technology and
possibly human capital, including the latter under technology more
generally. The Technical Appendix below makes this more precise.)
Thus, the development community devoted energy to putting in
place physical infrastructure for growth, while academic economists
sought to re-calibrate models and re-deﬁne variables to reduce the
measured contribution due to technology. As an example of these
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eﬀorts, consider human capital—education and training—which im-
proves labor quality and thus increases the eﬀective quantity of labor.
Accounting explicitly for human capital might then reduce the impor-
tance of technology in explaining economic growth.
By the time Paul Krugman [1994] articulated his justly-famous
critique of Singaporean development policy, the weight of opinion
had swung full circle back to an emphasis on technology—thanks to
forceful arguments developed meanwhile in Lucas [1988] and Romer
[1986, 1990, 1992]. Economies could not hope to sustain high growth
through savings and capital accumulation alone. Thus, by the mid
1990s, conventional wisdom was that a high TFP contribution to
economic growth indicated a successful economy, not one with mis-
measured capital stock and labor input. The way to increase TFP
growth was research and development (R&D)—raising the science
and knowledge base of the economy. Economists’ focus had shifted
from the incentive to accumulate physical capital to incentives for
knowledge accumulation and technical progress.
A simple formalization will help clarify the issues here as well
as others below. Suppose that total output Y satisﬁes a production
function:
Y = F (K,N, A˜), (1)
with K denoting the capital stock, N the quantity of labor, and A˜ a
ﬁrst, preliminary index of technology.
To deal with potential mismeasurement in technology and to high-
light the role of human capital, suppose that A˜ has two components, h
human capital per worker, and A technology proper. Because human
capital is embodied in workers, h is speciﬁc to an economy—assuming
for the discussion here that workers can be identiﬁed as belonging
to particular economies. By contrast, A is disembodied and global.
An alternative characterization might be that A describes codiﬁable
knowledge, while h describes tacit knowledge.
Denoting quantities in diﬀerent economies using subscripts, we
assume that
A˜j = (hj , A) (2)
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applied to (1) gives either
Yj = F (Kj , Nj × hj , Nj ×A) (3)
or
Yj = F (Kj , Nj × hj ×A). (4)
The technical appendix shows that in one important class of models
(section 7.3) standard assumptions surrounding (3) and (4) imply
equilibria where levels of per capita incomes or labor productivity,
Y/N , can be inﬂuenced by decisions on human capital. Growth rates
in labor productivity, however, remain equal to the growth rate of
technology A and thus invariant to decisions and policies on human
capital.
In a diﬀerent class of models (section 7.4) growth rates are inﬂu-
enced by human capital accumulation decisions. A key feature of such
models is that growth arises from interaction between demand and
supply-side characteristics, not just production-side developments.
The technical appendix clariﬁes the structural features distin-
guishing these two class of models. Notably, however, the models
in sections 7.3–7.4 take human capital to be used only in producing
goods and services. Then, advances in human capital can increase la-
bor productivity, even taking the state of technology as given. Such
models should be distinguished from those in, say, Romer [1990] where
human capital is an input into R&D and thus technical progress,
which thereby evolves endogenously. Human capital can therefore
play dual but conceptually distinct roles in economic growth.
Working out the relative contributions to growth of technology
and human capital, although not always distinct, matters. In the
decomposition (2), technology A is the accumulation of a kind of
knowledge resembling a global public good. Human capital h, how-
ever, is diﬀerent. One part of knowledge that matters for growth is
codiﬁable; the other, tacit.
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3 Dissemination and Catchup? A Persistent and Grow-
ing Divide
While A has always been viewed as an important engine of economic
growth—and the evidence and discussion of the previous section re-
conﬁrm this—recognizing the peculiar nature of the incentives for A’s
creation and dissemination raises a number of subtle issues.
A ﬁrst natural inclination is to view knowledge—ideas, blueprints,
designs, recipes—simply as a global public good. Two observations
argue for this.
First, knowledge is non-rival or inﬁnitely expansible [David, 1993,
Romer, 1990]: However costly it might be to create the ﬁrst instance
of a blueprint or an idea, subsequent copies have marginal cost zero.
The owner of an idea never loses possession of it, even after giving
away the idea to others.
This observation diﬀers from ideas being intangible: Haircuts are
intangible, but obviously not inﬁnitely expansible.
Second, knowledge disrespects physical geography and other bar-
riers, both natural and artiﬁcial. Knowledge is aspatial; ideas and
recipes can be transported arbitrary distances without degradation.
(As before, the intangibility of haircuts but their extreme location-
speciﬁcity makes clear why intangibility alone cannot be the deﬁn-
ing characteristic for knowledge.) The acceptability of diﬀerent ideas
might of course diﬀer across locations, depending on the users of those
ideas—but that varies not strictly with geographical or national bar-
riers, nor monotonically in physical distance.
An extreme view following from the two observations—ﬁrst, that
codiﬁable A accounts for most of economic growth and second, that
codiﬁable A is non-rival and has global reach—is that the world
should be roughly egalitarian, with all economies having approxi-
mately the same income levels. Or, if not, then at least income gaps
between countries should be gradually narrowing.
But the opposite is happening. While the whole world is getting
richer, the gap between poorest and richest is growing. Average per
capita income (real, purchasing power parity adjusted) has grown
at 2.25% per year since 1960. At the same time, however, the in-
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come ratio between the world’s 90th-percentile and 10th-percentile
economies grew from 12.3 in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s to 20.5 in
the second half of the 1980s [Quah, 1997, 2001a]. Moreover, distinct
income clusters—one at the high end of the income range, another
at the low end—appear to be emerging. The cross-economy income
distribution has dynamics that are diﬃcult to reconcile with a naive
view of knowledge dissemination.
If, to explain these observations, we allow the possibility that A,
the driver of growth, might diﬀer across countries, then technology
dissemination—how Aj in economy j helps improve Aj′ in economy
j′—becomes paramount for economic growth.
Dissemination mechanisms have been studied [e.g., Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1997, Cameron, Proudman, and Redding, 1998, Coe
and Helpman, 1995, Eaton and Kortum, 1999, Grossman and Help-
man, 1991], typically assuming that knowledge and technology are
embodied in intermediate inputs, and that property rights permit
monopoly operation by the owners of items of knowledge. How-
ever, in all these, that A is non-rival and aspatial is never explic-
itly considered. But it is those peculiar properties—nonrivalry and
aspatiality—that allow greatest parallel between developments in the
New Economy and what economists might know about technology
dissemination.
Parente and Prescott [2000] have posed questions that come clos-
est to the ones stated above. They too focus on A, and its apparent
inability to disseminate globally. They conclude that it is vested inter-
ests within a potentially A-receiving country that represent signiﬁcant
barriers to A’s dissemination. By contrast Quah [2001a] suggested
that those obstacles emerge from an equilibrium interaction between
A-transmitting and A-receiving economies. In section 5 below I con-
sider the possibility that it is high aversion to change and newness,
and low expertise among potential users of A that prevent A’s dis-
semination. This possibility had also been considered previously in
Quah [2001b] and Quah [2001c].
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4 The New Economy: Puzzles and Paradoxes
If we understand the New Economy to be no more than what has
emerged from the proliferation of information and communications
technology (ICT), then the New Economy ought to contain no great
surprises. ICT is just the most recent manifestation of an ongoing
sequence of technical progress. It should then also contribute to eco-
nomic performance the same way technical progress has always done.
4.1 Why might the New Economy be new?
Two observations suggest potential diﬀerences. First, for many, ICT
is a General Purpose Technology (GPT), bearing the power to in-
ﬂuence profoundly all sectors of an economy simultaneously [Help-
man, 1998]. Unlike technical advances in, say, pencil sharpeners,
ICT’s productivity improvements can ripple strongly through the en-
tire economy, aﬀecting everything from mergers and acquisitions in
corporate ﬁnance, to factory-ﬂoor rewiring of inventory management
mechanisms.
Second, ICT products themselves behave like knowledge [Quah,
2001c], in the sense described in Section 3 above. Whether or not
we consider, say, a Britney Spears MP3 ﬁle downloadable oﬀ the In-
ternet as a piece of scientiﬁc knowledge—and I suspect most people
would not—the fact remains, such an item has all the relevant eco-
nomic properties of knowledge: inﬁnite expansibility and disrespect
of geography. Thus, models of the spread of knowledge, like those de-
scribed earlier, can shed useful light on the forces driving the creation
and dissemination of ICT products. This view suggests something
markedly new in the New Economy—a change in the nature of goods
and services to become themselves more like knowledge.
This transformation importantly distinguishes modern technical
progress from earlier: The economy is now more knowledge-based,
not just from knowledge being used more intensively in production,
but from consumers’ having increasingly direct contact with goods
and services that behave like knowledge.
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4.2 Puzzles and paradoxes?
I now describe some puzzles relating technology, economic growth,
and the New Economy. I will suggest below that interpreting the
New Economy in the terms I have just described helps resolve some,
although not all, of these puzzles.
To overview, paradoxes in the knowledge-driven, technology-laden
economy are of three basic kinds:
1. What used to be just the Solow productivity paradox [Solow,
1987]—“you see computers everywhere except in the productiv-
ity numbers”—extends more generally to science and technol-
ogy. Put simply, a skeptic of the beneﬁts of computers must,
on the basis of productivity evidence, be similarly skeptical of
science and technology’s impact on economic growth.
2. It is not just that science and technology or ICT seem unrelated
to economic performance, the correlation is sometimes negative.
When output growth has increased, human capital deployment
in science and technology appears to have fallen.
3. Although it is by most measures the world’s leading technology
economy, the US imports more ICT than it exports. And its
TFP dynamics haven’t changed as much as have TFP dynamics
in other economies.
4.3 Solow productivity paradoxes
Fig. 1 contrasts rapidly expanding information technology (IT) in-
vestment with insigniﬁcant labor productivity improvement in the
US between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s [Kraemer and Dedrick,
2001]. In 1973, annual growth in IT spending rose to 17% from an
average of -0.2% over the preceding eight years. It then averaged
15.7% for the twenty-two years afterwards. Productivity growth av-
eraged 2.3% for the ﬁrst period, and then an anemic 0.9% subse-
quently. Thus, a potentially key addition to technological base of the
US economy appears, in reality, to have contributed not at all to US
productivity growth.
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Fig. 2 shows, however, that the puzzle is more profound than the
Solow paradox alone. From 1950 through 1988, the fraction of the
US labor force employed as scientists and engineers in R&D increased
four-fold, from 0.1% to 0.4% [Jones, 1995]. The increase in this series
is much smoother: As much increase occurred after 1972 as before.
Yet, as we earlier saw from Fig. 1, labor productivity growth fell
sharply. (For completeness, Fig. 2 also graphs TFP growth, which re-
lates much the same story as labor productivity growth.) The smooth
secular rise in science and technology inputs engendered nothing re-
motely similar in incomes or productivity.
I conclude that whatever mechanism relates technology inputs—
scientists and engineers; information technology—with measured pro-
ductivity improvements, it is little understood. That mechanism is
no more transparent for prosaic and uncontroversial inputs such as
scientists and R&D engineers than it is for ICT.
The puzzle only deepens turning to more recent evidence on the
US economy. Over 1995–1999, growth in nonfarm business sector
productivity rose to an annual rate of 2.9%, more than double its av-
erage over the previous two decades [U. S. Department of Commerce,
1999]. Was this the long-awaited resolution of the Solow productiv-
ity paradox? If so, yet a diﬀerent paradox emerges. Over this time,
human capital indicators for science and technology in the US de-
clined almost uniformly. Figures from the National Science Founda-
tion (http://caspar.nsf.gov/) show that while between 1987 and
1997 the total number of bachelor’s degrees increased by 18%, that for
computer science fell by 36%, for mathematics and statistics by 23%,
for engineering 16%, and for physical sciences, 1%. Burrelli [2001]
reports that US science and engineering graduate enrollment fell in
every single year since 1993, turning around only in 1999. Just as US
productivity growth was starting to increase, measurable science and
engineering inputs for generating new technology were doing exactly
the opposite.
The preceding observations suggest, in my view, a number of com-
plications in the stylization that science and engineering constitute
direct inputs into technical progress in turn, driving economic growth.
If there is a productivity paradox for ICT and the New Economy, then
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a yet larger one holds for science and technology more broadly.
4.4 International puzzles
Most studies have thus far focused on the US, but cross-country ev-
idence raises yet further puzzles. Is the US the world’s leading New
Economy? In 1997 the share of ICT in total business employment
was the same, 3.9% [OECD, 2000], for both the US and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). However, comparing the two blocs, the US is
clearly well ahead on both value added and R&D expenditure. In the
US, the share of ICT value added in the business sector was 8.7%,
while the share of ICT R&D expenditure was 38.0%. The EU, by
contrast, had ICT value added of only 6.4%, and R&D expenditure
in ICT 23.6%.
That the EU numbers are averages across nation states, however,
disguises wide diversity across diﬀerent economies. Thus, a number of
EU member states as well as other OECD economies show up ahead
of the US in New Economy/ICT indicators [OECD, 2000, Tables 1–
3, pp. 32–34]. Compared to the US, ICT share in total business
employment is higher in Sweden (6.3%), Finland (5.6%), the UK
(4.8%), and Ireland (4.6%). Similarly, Korea (10.7%), Sweden (9.3%),
the UK (8.4%), and Finland (8.3%) each have ICT shares of value
added that exceed the US’s. The share of ICT R&D expenditure
is 51% in Finland and 48% in Ireland. Moreover, in 1998 the US
imported USD 35.9 billion more ICT than it exported [OECD, 2000,
Table 4, p. 35]. By contrast, Japan (USD 54.3 billion), Korea (USD
13.6 billion), Ireland (USD 5.8 billion), Finland (USD 3.6 billion),
and Sweden (USD 2.8 billion) all showed ICT trade surpluses.1
Finally, if the New Economy and ICT are supposed to have af-
1 I have not been able to get more disaggregated statistics on the
kinds of ICT products that are aggregated in the statistics above.
Perhaps intra-industry trade and product diﬀerentiation might be
insightful for thinking about these numbers. If so, however, it also
suggests that an aggregate, macro emphasis on ICT and productivity
is misleading for assessing economic performance.
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fected TFP’s dynamics in the US economy, they appear to have done
so less than in economies like Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. Van-
houdt and Onorante [2001] document that for the US the contribution
of TFP to economic growth has remained approximately constant at
71%–72% throughout both the 1970s and the 1990s. By contrast,
Finland saw an increase in TFP contribution to its growth perfor-
mance from 60% to 85%; Ireland, from 63% to in essence 100%; and
Sweden, from 51% to 72%.
No single piece of empirical evidence here is overwhelming by it-
self, but the range of them suggests to me a couple of surprising pos-
sibilities. First, it is economies like Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Korea,
and Japan that, in diﬀerent dimensions, are more New Economy than
the US—the ﬁrst three of these, most consistently so. Second, to the
extent that the US has been a successful New Economy and has pow-
ered ahead on the technology supply side, it is its ICT consumption,
the demand side, that has grown even more.
4.5 What does the New Economy have to be?
This discussion brings us full circle to my Introduction, that the con-
sumption or demand side of the New Economy deserves greater at-
tention than it has thus far attracted.
By contrast, productivity-focused New Economy analyses are nu-
merous and varied, and include the inﬂuential and provocative study
of Gordon [2000]. In that work, the author identiﬁes the New Econ-
omy as the acceleration in the rate of price declines of computers
and related technologies since 1995. He compares New Economy de-
velopments to what he calls “Five Great Inventions” from the past,
identiﬁed as product clusters surrounding (1) electricity; (2) the inter-
nal combustion engine; (3) chemical technologies (notably molecule-
rearranging technologies, incorporating developments in petroleum,
plastics, and pharmaceuticals); (4) pre-World War 2 entertainment,
communications, and information (including the telegraph, telephone,
and television); and (5) running water, indoor plumbing, and ur-
ban sanitation infrastructure. In Gordon’s analysis, these clusters of
technological developments drove the immense productivity improve-
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ments of the Second Industrial Revolution, 1860—1910. In Gordon’s
deﬁnition, the New Economy pales by comparison.
There is no question that Gordon’s list of Great Inventions in-
cludes critically important technical developments. But comparing
mere price reductions—if that is all the New Economy is—in inven-
tions already extant (computers, telecommunications) to the items
in the list hardly seems a balanced beginning to assess their rela-
tive importance. Moreover, the past always looks good—the further
back the past, the better. The further-back past has been around
longer than the only-recent past, and so has had greater opportunity
to inﬂuence the world around us.
As an extreme, consider that at the end of 1999 a group of lead-
ing thinkers were asked what they considered the critical inventions
of the millennium. Freeman Dyson, the renowned theoretical physi-
cist, extended the choice to cover two millennia, and nominated dried
grass:
“The most important invention of the last two thousand
years was hay. In the classical world of Greece and Rome
and in all earlier times, there was no hay. Civilization
could exist only in warm climates where horses could stay
alive through the winter by grazing. Without grass in
winter you could not have horses, and without horses you
could not have urban civilization. Some time during the
so-called dark ages, some unknown genius invented hay,
forests were turned into meadows, hay was reaped and
stored, and civilization moved north over the Alps. So hay
gave birth to Vienna and Paris and London and Berlin,
and later to Moscow and New York.”
(Freeman Dyson, 1999)
Very prosaic, minor changes can have profound eﬀects, if they stay
around long enough.
Gordon’s list focuses on how the supply side of the economy has
changed. Even (4) from his list is of interest, in his analysis, because
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it made the world smaller (“in a sense more profound than the In-
ternet” [Gordon, 2000]), and really should include the postal system
and public libraries leading, in turn, to literacy and reading.
In the analysis I develop here, by contrast, the New Economy is
not only or even primarily a change in cost conditions on the supply
side, then aﬀecting the rest of the economy that uses that technology.
Instead, it is the change in the nature of goods and services to be-
come increasingly like knowledge. To draw out again the underlying
theme, this is not just to say those goods and services are science
and technology-intensive, but instead that their physical properties
in consumption are the same as those of knowledge.
Such goods and services are becoming more important in two
respects: ﬁrst, as a fraction of total consumption; and second, in their
increasingly direct contact with a growing number of consumers. To
be concrete then, I include in this New Economy deﬁnition:
1. information and communications technology, including the In-
ternet;
2. intellectual assets;
3. electronic libraries and databases;
4. biotechnology, i.e., carbon-based libraries and databases.
The common, distinctive features of these categories are, as earlier
indicated: they represent goods and services with the same proper-
ties as knowledge; they are increasingly important in value added,
and they represent goods and services with whom a growing number
of ﬁnal consumers are coming into direct contact. Quah [2001c] has
called such goods knowledge-products. (This is partly to distinguish
the issues here from those typically studied in, say, the “economics
of information.” The economic impact of a word-processing package,
process-controller software, gene sequence libraries, database usage,
or indeed the Open Source Software movement can be fruitfully con-
sidered without necessarily bringing in ideas such as moral hazard,
adverse selection, or contract theory—the usual “economics of infor-
mation” concerns.)
Categories (1)–(4) in my deﬁnition are, of course, not mutually
exclusive. Intellectual assets (2) include both patentable ideas and
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computer software, with the latter obviously included in ICT (1) as
well. But by intellectual assets, I refer also to software in its most
general form, i.e., not just computer software, but also video and
other digital entertainment, and recorded music. Finally, I prefer
the term “intellectual assets” because it does not presume a social
institution—such as patents and copyrights—to shape patterns of
use, the way that, say, the term “intellectual property” does.
Viewing the New Economy as changes only on the supply or pro-
ductivity side can give only part of the picture. This simpliﬁcation
is sometimes useful. Here it misleads. It generates an unhealthy ob-
session with attempting to measure the New Economy’s productivity
impacts. But even were that focus justiﬁed, shifting attention to the
demand or consumption side helps raise other important and subtle
new issues.
5 Knowledge in Consumption and Economic Growth
When the New Economy is identiﬁed with its potential supply-side
impact, the critical links are threefold. First, the New Economy
emphasizes knowledge, and knowledge raises productivity. Second,
improved information allows tighter control of distribution channels,
and with better-informed plans, inventory holdings can be reduced.
Third, delivery lags have shortened so that productive factor inputs—
capital and labor—can be reallocated faster and with less frictional
wastage.
In the stylization from Section 2 and running through most of the
discussion of Sections 3 and 4, knowledge and the New Economy are
represented by A in the production function
Y = F (K,N,A) (5)
(now ignoring the distinction between A and A˜ from Section 2). In
the conventional analysis, controversy surrounds the quantitative di-
mension to this relation: Just how much does the New Economy aﬀect
A; what is the multiplier on A for Y ?
What I have tried to argue above is that the New Economy is most
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usefully viewed as moving A from the production function (5) to be
an argument in agents’ preferences. The New Economy is a set of
structural changes in the economy that have ended up inserting into
utility functions objects that have the characteristics of A. Succinctly,
if U represents a utility function, and C the consumption of other,
standard commodities, then the New Economy is
U = U(C,A). (6)
Quah [2001c] has studied a model where learning to use new A is
costly in time, and therefore A aﬀects consumers’ budget constraint.
The indirect utility function is then a reduced-form representation
with exactly the features of (6).
That A disrespects geography and is inﬁnitely expansible has pro-
found implications for the behavior of consumers as well as produc-
ers. For one, transportation costs and end-user location can no longer
satisfactorily explain what we see in patterns of economic geography
[Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999, Quah, 2000, 2001b]. For an-
other, demand-side characteristics assume increased importance in
determining market outcomes [Quah, 2001c].
To see this second point, consider two possibilities. First, suppose
societies have established institutions—intellectual property rights
(IPRs) like patents, say—that prevent driving the market price of
knowledge products to zero marginal cost. Social institutions do this
by making copying illegal for all but the IPR holder. The IPR holder
then operates as a monopolist, delivering a quantity and charging a
price determined entirely by the demand curve. Cost considerations
determine proﬁts, but not price or quantity—it is demand alone that
determines market outcomes.
Second, suppose the opposite, i.e., that IPR institutions do not ex-
ist. Knowledge-products then are not protected by IPRs, but have in-
centive mechanisms for their creation and dissemination separated—
as might happen, say, under systems of patronage or procurement
[David, 1993]. Then inﬁnite expansibility of the knowledge-product
results in the supply side supplying as much as the demand side will
bear, in a way divorced from the structure of costs in creation. Again,
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then, the ultimate determinant of market outcomes is the demand
side.
These observations suggest the seemingly paradoxical conclusion
that the most serious obstacle impeding progress in the New Economy
might be consumer-side reluctance to participate in it. The advanced
technologies around us might well turn out to be unproductive, not
because of any defect inherent to them, but instead simply because
we users have chosen not to use those technologies to best eﬀect.
Statistical evidence in Jalava and Pohjola [2002] suggests two con-
clusions that bear on this hypothesis. First, in the US in the 1990s,
ICT use provided beneﬁts exceeding those from ICT production. Sec-
ond, in Finland the contribution of ICT use to output growth has
more than doubled in the 1990s.
Evidence of a diﬀerent nature also sheds light on this demand-
side hypothesis. Quah [2001c] describes a historical example where
demand-side considerations mattered critically for technical progress.
China at the end of the Sung dynasty in the 14th century was nei-
ther chockful of dot-com entrepreneurs nor brimming with Internet
infrastructure. However, it did stand on the brink of an industrial rev-
olution, four centuries before the Industrial Revolution of late 18th-
century Western Europe.2
China produced more iron per capita in the 14th century than did
Europe in the early 18th. Blast furnace and pig/wrought iron tech-
nologies were more advanced in China in 200 BCE than European
ones in the 1500s. In China, iron’s price relative to grain fell, within
2 The analysis in Quah [2001c] had been originally motivated by
my reading of Jones [1988] and Mokyr [1990]. Since those, Landes
[1998] has further re-ignited controversy over the historical facts; see,
e.g., Pomeranz [2000]. What matter for my discussion are not precise
details on how much exactly China might have been ahead of Europe,
when—within a 5-century span of time—catchup from one to the
other occurred, or if the reversal was sudden or gradual. No one
disputes that 14th-century China was technologically advanced nor
that afterwards China lost signiﬁcant technologies that it had earlier
had. It is these that I draw on for the current discussion.
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a century, to a third of its level at the end of the ﬁrst millennium—a
technological improvement not achieved in the West until the 18th
century. Paper, gunpowder, water-powered spinning machines, block
printing, and durable porcelain moveable type were all available in
China between 400 to 1000 years earlier than in Europe. China’s in-
vention of the compass in 960 and ship construction using watertight
bouyancy chambers made the Chinese the world’s most technologi-
cally formidable sailors, by as much as ﬁve centuries ahead of those
in the West.
China’s lead over Europe along this wide range of technical fronts
has long suggested to some that China should have seen an indus-
trial revolution 400 years before Europe. Detractors from this view
do, of course, have a point: Perhaps China wasn’t ahead in every
single dimension of technological prowess. But fretting over speciﬁc
details on, for instance, whether the Chinese used gunpowder mostly
for ﬁreworks rather than warfare, or whether their understanding of
technology was more bluesky science rather than engineering oriented
(or indeed vice versa), seems niggardly—academic even—in light of
the impressively broad array of demonstrated technical competencies
in China. Yet, despite this, the subsequent ﬁve centuries saw dismal
Chinese economic decline, rather than sweeping economic progress.
Why?
One reasonable conjecture, it seems to me, is that China’s failure
to exploit its technical base was a failure of demand. In 14th-century
China, technological knowledge was tightly controlled. Scholars and
bureaucrats kept technical secrets to themselves; it was said that the
Emperor “owned” time itself. The bureaucrats believed that dissem-
inating knowledge about technology subverted the power structure
and undermined their position. That might well have been so. But,
as a result, no large customer base for technology developed, and
technological development languished after its early and promising
start.
Eighteenth-century European entrepreneurs, in contrast, were ea-
ger to use high-technology products such as the spinning jenny and
the steam engine. Strong demand encouraged yet further technical
progress. In 1781, to encourage sharper engineering eﬀort, Matthew
–20–
Technology and Growth: Lessons for the New Economy
Boulton wrote James Watt that “The people in London, Manchester,
and Birmingham are steam-mill mad” [Pool, 1997, p. 126].
Great excitement across broad swathes of society ﬁred the eco-
nomic imagination and drove technology into immediate application,
as described in equation (6). Europe took the lead; China languished.
I do not know if these demand-side considerations explain the
paradoxes in section 4 above. But they suggest to me that perhaps
we might have been looking in the wrong place all along for evidence
on the New Economy.
6 Conclusion
Because the New Economy is so intertwined with Information and
Communications Technology, we are primed to think of New Economy
developments as nothing more than technology-driven, productivity-
improving changes on the supply side. We then want New Economy
developments to do what all technical progress has historically done.
And we emerge disappointed when we ﬁnd productivity has not sky-
rocketed, inﬂation has not forever disappeared, business downturns
have not permanently vanished, and ﬁnancial markets have not re-
mained stratospheric.
This paper argued that the most profound changes in the New
Economy are not productivity or supply-side improvements, but in-
stead consumption or demand side changes. The paper summarized
the case for the importance of technical progress in economic growth,
argued why the New Economy diﬀers and described how it is truly
new, and drawn lessons from economic history to highlight potential
pitfalls and dangers as the New Economy continues to evolve.
The technical appendix studied the role of human capital in eco-
nomic growth, clarifying when human capital aﬀects income levels but
not growth rates and when it does so growth rates. It emphasized
the distinction between human capital used for improving technol-
ogy and human capital used in producing goods and services. Both
matter and each separately can inﬂuence economic growth. The key
ﬁnding is that endogenous growth results from the interaction of de-
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mand and supply features, contrasting sharply with economic growth
emerging solely from production-side characteristics.
Policy implications from this analysis are twofold. The ﬁrst in-
volves measurement; the second, longer-term concerns. We might be
looking in the wrong place—supply-side developments—for evidence
on the impact of the New Economy. Demand-side changes—the be-
havior of consumers—might be where we need to document more
carefully the New Economy. This is not to suggest a naive Keynesian-
type conclusion that only the demand-side is important. Both supply
and demand matter—in growth as in all other economic outcomes.
This altered emphasis in the ultimate source of economic growth
leads in turn to the second, longer-term implication. If the profound
changes are to be on the part of consumers, and those changes take
a while to ﬁlter through to steady-state equilibrium growth, perhaps
we should simply stay the course, have faith in the New Economy,
and not obsess about measuring productivity changes in the short
term. Skilled, discerning consumers and increased levels of broad-
based education—for encouraging improved uses of technology, for
raising labor productivity, for pushing back the frontiers of science
and technology—are what will drive economic growth, one way or
another.
7 Technical Appendix
This appendix studies the role of human capital in growth. It consid-
ers two classes of models: First, where human capital choices inﬂuence
levels but not growth rates; second, where human capital choices in-
ﬂuence steady-state growth rates. (To isolate the direct role of human
capital, this Appendix does not consider the case where technology
is inﬂuenced by inputs of human capital [e.g., Romer, 1990].)
We will see that, in general, it is not the details on the mechanism
for accumulating human capital that matter for distinguishing the two
diﬀerent eﬀects. Instead, it is the a priori assumption on how human
capital enters the production function. Recall production function
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(1),
Y = F (K,N, A˜),
and assume that A˜ comprises two components (h,A), where h is per
worker human capital and A is technology proper.
In the ﬁrst class of models—where human capital aﬀects income
levels but not growth rates—the total stock of human capital is a
separate capital input, paralleling physical capital
Y = F (K,N, A˜) = F (K,H,NA), with H = hN. (PF0)
The second class of models has human capital attached explicitly to
workers [e.g., Lucas, 1988, Rebelo, 1991, Uzawa, 1965]:
Y = F (K,N, A˜) = F (K,hNA) = F (K,HA). (PF1)
Human capital then augments labor the same way as does technology,
and—we will see below—aﬀects growth rates in steady state.3
Section 7.3 below will treat the ﬁrst class of models, while section
7.4 the second.4 Assume throughout that F , whether in (PF0) or
(PF1), is constant returns to scale or homogeneous degree 1 (HD1).
The core of the material below is suﬃciently well known that
it appears in a number of textbooks [e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995]. However, the organization and emphases diﬀer. Most im-
portant, this Appendix explicitly includes in the analysis technical
3 To emphasize, in (PF0) the aggregate human capital stock H
appears as factor input, additional to and separate from labor N .
Such a production function is used in, e.g., Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil [1992], where it takes the speciﬁc form KαHβ(NA)1−α−β , with
α, β > 0 and α+ β < 1.
4 A third class of models—e.g., Jones [1998, Ch. 3] or Romer
[2001, 3.8]—speciﬁes production function (PF1) as in the second class
of growth models, but then bounds the amount of human capital per
worker that can be accumulated. The results then are the same as in
levels-but-not-growth models, so this Appendix will incorporate them
in section 7.3 below.
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change, population growth, and diﬀerent depreciation rates on hu-
man and physical capital. This is more than just book-keeping, as
without them one is unable to examine the interaction between, say,
technical change and human capital accumulation. Thus, we will see
in section 7.4 below that with ongoing technical progress, when hu-
man capital contributes to growth its reduced-form relationship with
income and physical capital shows a diminishing signiﬁcance—even
though were human capital absent, growth would fall. Put diﬀerently,
even when human capital matters, an empirical researcher will dis-
cover no stable cointegrating relationship of it with physical capital
and income.
Next, under the same conditions, we will see that, unlike physical
capital, human capital must become progressively costlier to accu-
mulate. As technology advances, incrementing the typical worker’s
stock of human capital will, in equilibrium , demand ever-greater re-
sources. Thus the analysis in section 7.4 captures the intuition that
technologically-advanced economies require substantial, costly train-
ing, even if measured human capital shows no large corresponding
increases resulting from that training.
Turning from substantive to expositional considerations, the anal-
ysis including all the above additional possibilities and using general
functional forms is conceptually easier than when applying just, say,
Cobb-Douglas functions.5 Without being any more complicated, the
5 Using general functional forms—assuming, say, no more than
constant returns to scale—clears up any lingering doubts about a
possible knife-edge nature to the conclusions. And it prevents the
usual explosive cascade of exponents in α’s and (1−α)’s in the expo-
sition where descriptions such as “the net marginal product of phys-
ical capital” then become ambiguously aliased into a whole range of
other possible interpretations. As just one example, equation (5.13)
on p. 180 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] uses ν to mean two log-
ically diﬀerent things—one a Lagrange multiplier, the other an allo-
cation share. Later on, just before equation (5.18) the authors use a
“signiﬁcant amount of algebra” (omitted) to obtain a critical result.
Of course, their accurate and powerful economic intuition gets them
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development in section 7.4 includes as convenient special cases a num-
ber of well-known models of growth with human capital.
Although all the material below is technically more diﬃcult than
that in the text, sections 7.1–7.3 remain relatively less formal and
rigorous. Section 7.4, on the other hand, requires greater preci-
sion in the statements, and so uses a much more formal (deﬁni-
tion/theorem/proof) presentation.
7.1 General setup
As far as possible I use the following notational convention: Up-
percase letters denote economy-wide quantities; lowercase, their per
capita or per worker versions. the Roman alphabet denotes observ-
able economic timeseries; Greek, parameters or coeﬃcients. The more
complicated is the symbol (tildes, underscores) the less easily is what
it denotes found in national income accounts. Necessarily, however,
there will be some exceptions: the state of technology, A, cannot be
directly measured, but the symbol is so much used in the literature,
calling it something else would only confuse.
Assume
N˙/N = ν ≥ 0, N(0) > 0, and (7)
A˙/A = ξ ≥ 0, A(0) > 0, (8)
i.e., the labor force and technology evolve at constant proportional
growth rates. Endogenous population and technology models alter
(7) and (8), respectively, setting out mechanisms and incentives for
determining N˙/N and A˙/A. This Technical Appendix focuses on
human capital, however, and so we will retain (7) and (8).
Let the labor force equal the population, and deﬁne per worker
output and capital:
y
def= Y/N and k def= K/N,
to the correct answer in any case. My exposition below, conversely,
never uses any signiﬁcant amount of algebraic manipulation.
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and their technology-adjusted versions:
y˜
def= Y/NA and k˜ def= K/NA. (9)
In this formulation y is simultaneously also per capita income as
well as average labor productivity. Following the same convention
also deﬁne H to denote total human capital H def= h × N , and the
technology-adjusted version
h˜ = H/NA = h/A. (10)
(This last deﬁnition will turn out to be useful only in section 7.3
below.) Aggregate physical and human capital depreciate at instan-
taneous ﬂow rates δK and δH respectively.
To ﬁx ideas, section 7.2 establishes the Solow neoclassical growth
model in our notation. Section 7.3 extends this to where human
capital aﬀects levels but not growth rates. To clarify the connection
to the Solow model, the discussion here follows Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil [1992] in assuming ad hoc accumulation in physical and human
capital. This is not crucial though: An optimizing Cass-Koopmans
analysis obtains the same results. What matters is assuming the
production function (PF0) rather than (PF1).
Section 7.4 turns to an optimizing framework, and shows how
switching between production functions (PF0) and (PF1) allows hu-
man capital to aﬀect growth rates.
7.2 Neoclassical growth
Following Solow [1956], let physical capital K evolve as:
K˙ = τKY − δKK, K(0) > 0, τK ∈ (0, 1), and δK > 0, (11)
with K˙ denotingK’s time derivative and τK the savings or investment
rate. It will be useful to deﬁne the deepening constant
ζK
def= (ν + ξ) + δK > 0.
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In this ﬁrst model take h to be constant. Specialize production
function (1) to the constant returns to scale function
Y = F (K,NA). (12)
A balanced-growth steady state (BGSS) is a collection of timepaths
{ y(t), k(t) : t }
such that y˙/y and k/y are constant in time. An equilibrium is a
collection of time paths
{ y(t), k(t) : t ∈ [0,∞) }
satisfying equations (11)–(12). A BGSS equilibrium is a BGSS satis-
fying equations (11)–(12).
To understand the properties of equilibrium, divide (12) through-
out by NA to obtain
y˜ = F (k˜, 1) def= f(k˜).
Using (7)–(9) in equation (11) then gives
˙˜
k/k˜ = τK × f(k˜)k˜−1 − ζK , k˜(0) > 0. (13)
Under standard economic assumptions on f = F (·, 1) the diﬀerential
equation (13) implies that k˜ converges from any initial point k˜(0) to
the unique solution of
f(k˜)k˜−1 = ζK × τ−1K .
Thus in equilibrium at BGSS, capital per worker
k = K/N = k˜A
grows at the constant rate A˙/A = ξ. Output per worker




converges similarly to a unique time path that grows in BGSS at the
same constant, exogenously-given rate ξ.
Summarizing, in this model with h constant, in BGSS the growth
rate of per capita income equals that for technology.
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7.3 Two Models of Growth with Human Capital: Levels
but not Growth Rates
This section studies two diﬀerent models for human capital in eco-
nomic growth. In the ﬁrst h human capital per worker increases
without bound; in the second h remains ﬁnite in steady state. Both
models, however, predict that choices on human capital inﬂuence only
the level of output per worker. Steady-state growth rates will remain
ﬁxed at that for technology, A˙/A = ξ, as in the model above.
First, [following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992] suppose pro-
duction function (1) now takes the form of equation (PF0)
Y = F (K,H,NA),
with constant returns to scale in all three arguments.
Parallel with physical capital accumulation (11) let H evolve as:
H˙ = τHY − δHH, H(0) > 0, 0 < τK + τH < 1, and δH > 0, (14)
with τH the rate of investment in human capital. Human capital
increases from resources spent on it—schooling, for example—and
depreciates at a constant proportional rate. Investment on human
capital is a constant fraction of income. Equation (14) allows h =
H/N to increase without bound. Indeed, in the equilibrium described
below, h will diverge to inﬁnity.
A balanced-growth steady state (BGSS) is a collection of time
paths
{ y(t), k(t), h(t) : t }
such that y˙/y, k/y, and h/y are constant in time. An equilibrium is
a collection of time paths
{ y(t), k(t), h(t) : t ∈ [0,∞) }
satisfying equations (PF0), (11), and (14). A BGSS equilibrium is a
BGSS satisfying equations (PF0), (11), and (14).
To see the properties of equilibrium, rewrite (PF0) in technology-
adjusted per capita form:
y˜ = F (k˜, h˜, 1) def= f(k˜, h˜).
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As with the deﬁnition of ζK , let
ζH
def= (ν + ξ) + δH > 0.
Then just as we obtained (13) for the neoclassical growth model, we
have
˙˜
k/k˜ = τK × f(k˜, h˜)k˜−1 − ζK and (15)
˙˜h/h˜ = τH × f(k˜, h˜)h˜−1 − ζH . (16)
The pair of equations (15)–(16) implies a steady state in (k˜, h˜) satis-
fying
f(k˜, h˜)k˜−1 = ζK × τ−1K and f(k˜, h˜)h˜−1 = ζH × τ−1H . (17)
Because F is HD1, function f will not be. Equation (17) then has
a full-rank Jacobean and thus determines a unique pair (k˜, h˜). From
(15)–(16) the vector (k˜, h˜) globally converges to the unique solution
of (17). (Note that were f HD1, then the Jacobean of (17) would be
singular. Then, if a solution existed, equation (17) would determine
not (k˜, h˜) separately, but only their ratio.)
A useful interpretation of this result derives from recognizing that
the left side of equations (17) are the average products of physical
and human capital respectively, holding ﬁxed technology-augmented
labor NA. When F is HD1 those average products decline to zero
even when the other capital input rises proportionally. Although no
explicit optimization informs the accumulation decision, the hypoth-
esized savings functions imply slowing accumulation, (15) and (16),
with declining average products. Therefore, k˜ and h˜ do not grow
indeﬁnitely but instead converge to unique, ﬁnite values.
From the dynamics of (k˜, h˜) per capita income y = Y/N converges
too to a unique steady-state path that grows at rate A˙/A = ξ. This
is exactly as in the neoclassical growth model in section 7.2. The
level of the steady-state path in y varies: For instance, it increases in
steady-state h˜, which could be caused by, among other possibilities,
a higher investment rate τH on human capital. However, to repeat,
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the growth rate of per capita income remains entirely unaﬀected,
equalling ξ always.
The second model—following Jones [1998, Ch. 3] or Romer [2001,
3.8]—again leaves unaﬀected the key growth predictions of the neo-
classical model. Suppose as before that h increases through invest-
ment, or through education in particular. However, while education
can raise a worker’s human capital with no diminishing returns, the
amount of time that a worker can devote to education is bounded.
Then even if all the worker’s lifetime were spent on education, her
human capital can, at most, reach some ﬁnite upper limit. Speciﬁ-
cations that embody this implication include many typically used in
labor economics. For instance,
h(s) = h0eψs, s ∈ [0, 1]; h0, ψ > 0,
with s denoting the fraction of time spent in schooling, implies a




(usually taken to equal 0.10 [e.g., Jones, 1998, Ch. 3]). But then even
as s increases to its upper limit of 1, per worker human capital h
approaches only at most h0eψ <∞.
Use production function (PF1)
Y = F (K,NhA),
assumed to satisfy constant returns to scale, so that
y˜ = F (k˜, h).
Denote the solution to a worker’s optimization problem on ed-
ucation choice by the constant s¯, so that the corresponding human
capital level is
h¯ = h0eψs¯ ∈ [h0, h0eψ].
Then, using (PF1), (7), and (8), the physical capital accumulation
equation (11) becomes
˙˜k/k˜ = τK × F (k˜, h¯)k˜−1 − ζK . (18)
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But the behavior k˜ from (18) is exactly the same as that from (13),
up to a shift factor in levels, induced by h¯. Thus, again, k˜ converges
from any initial point k˜(0) to the unique solution of
F (k˜, h¯)k˜−1 = ζK × τ−1K .
Under standard assumptions on F , the steady state level of k˜ is in-
creasing in h¯, and thus in s¯. However, the steady growth rate of
capital per worker k = K/N is simply A˙/A = ξ, independent of s¯.
Output per worker y = Y/N inherits the same properties of global
convergence and invariant steady-state growth rate. Thus, while lev-
els of output per worker increase with education, growth rates are
unchanged.
7.4 Growth with Human Capital
The models thus far have used arbitrary accumulation processes (11)
and (14) and either production function (PF0) or production func-
tion (PF1) with bounded per worker human capital. In all cases per
capita income growth occurred only from technical progress A˙/A = ξ.
This section adopts production function (PF1) and allows per worker
human capital to grow without bound. For completeness, the dis-
cussion also takes an optimizing approach to accumulating physical
and human capital, in place of the arbitrary (11) and (14). It is easy
to see, however, that replacing (PF1) with (PF0) would restore the
growth results of the previous section.
The analysis in this section includes, in a consistent notation,
special cases such as the one-sector model in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[1995, 5.1] and the two-sector model in Rebelo [1991]—and therefore
the Lucas model [Lucas, 1988] as well.
A social planner for the economy will solve a welfare optimization
program that can then be decentralized with markets. Let C denote
aggregate consumption so that, as above,
c = C/N and c˜ = c/A
respectively deﬁne per capita and technology-intensive, per capita
consumption.
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Everyone in the economy is identical and inﬁnitely-lived. The
representative agent discounts the future at constant rate ρ > 0, and
has instantaneous utility U(c), where U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and
U ′(c)→∞ as c→ 0.
Social welfare is∫ ∞
0









If U has the CRRA form
U(c) =
c1−θ − 1
1− θ , θ > 0,
then R(c) = θ constant. However, to clarify the role that utility
function U plays in the growth analysis, I will write R in general
and assume it constant when necessary, rather than introduce a new
parameter θ.
Assume the production functions (PF0) and (PF1) are everywhere
continuously diﬀerentiable. Denote partial derivatives with respect
to their j-th argument by Fj . As mnemonic, write FK = F1 and
FH = F2, noting that in general FH 
= ∂F/∂H. For instance, in
(PF1), ∂F/∂H equals F2A = FHA. Since F is HD1, each Fj is HD0.
The technology-adjusted per capita versions of (PF0) and (PF1) are,
respectively,
y˜ = F (k˜, h˜, 1) def= f(k˜, h˜) and
y˜ = F (k˜, h) def= f(k˜, h).
The function f corresponding to (PF0) is decreasing returns to scale.
That for (PF1) has h rather than h˜ as argument, and retains the
HD1 property—it is the same function as F , but I will write f to
treat (PF0) and (PF1) simultaneously. I will also carry along the
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mnemonic fK and fH for partial derivatives in the ﬁrst and second
arguments; again, fK = ∂f/∂k˜ 
= ∂f/∂K. Second partial derivatives
will, analogously, be denoted fKK and so on. For now assume only
that all ﬁrst partial derivatives are non-negative; they might or might
not satisfy Inada-type conditions. Because further assumptions on f
vary with the model, I will restrict f as necessary below rather than
here.
Denote by IK aggregate investment devoted to changing physical
capital, and by IH that for changing human capital. Here, IH ex-
cludes learning-by-doing but includes formal schooling and training—
activities that draw resources away from consumption and physical
capital investment. Assume that IK , subject to being non-negative,
can be costlessly transformed with consumption C, so both are mea-
sured in the same numeraire units. By contrast, private agents can
trade IH only at price q, not necessarily unity. The aggregate econ-
omy might, of course, face additional constraints on IH—the two, IK
and IH , might never be directly tradeable—but this q interpretation
allows a consistent treatment of a range of diﬀerent models. The







The national income identity is
Y = C + IK + IH · q,
with technology-adjusted per capita version
y˜ = c˜+ i˜K + i˜H · q.
Since y˜ = f(k˜, h), when q is positive this equation describes the ten-
sion between consumption and accumulating physical capital on the
one hand and accumulating human capital on the other. Models
where H increases through, say, learning by doing signiﬁcantly de-
part from such a tension.
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Physical capital accumulation follows:
K˙ = IK − δKK =⇒ ˙˜k = i˜K − ζK k˜. (19)
How H depends on IH will vary, depending on what is being studied
in a particular model, and won’t necessarily be exactly as the relation
above between K˙ and IK .
Definition 7.1 A balanced-growth steady state (BGSS) is a collec-
tion of time paths
{ y(t), c(t), k(t), h(t), q(t) : t }
such that y˙/y, h˙/h, c/y, k/y, and q are invariant in time.
The deﬁnition implies c˙/c = k˙/k = y˙/y. However, the relation be-
tween h and y is left unspeciﬁed: this will matter below. Write
g
def= y˙/y for the growth rate of per capita income or, equivalently,
worker productivity in BGSS.
Without pretending to replace an equilibrium analysis, we can
already conjecture at the formal results to come. If F is either (PF0)
or (PF1) with h bounded, then BGSS has:
y˙/y = c˙/c = k˙/k = ξ = A˙/A.
When F is (PF0), then we also have in BGSS h˙/h = ξ so that h/y
is invariant. Growth comes only from technical progress: No other
outcome is possible with f displaying decreasing returns to scale.6
If, however, F is (PF1) then BGSS potentially has
y˙/y = c˙/c = k˙/k = h˙/h+ ξ,
6 This overstates somewhat. Even with F given by (PF0), BGSS
with y˙/y > ξ might be possible if h/y grows without bound. However,
for consumption to remain bounded from below given the national
income identity, h accumulation must then become progressively less
resource-demanding. This seems implausible.
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so that the economy’s growth rate g exceeds both h˙/h and A˙/A.
We of course need a model still to determine g in equilibrium, but
regardless of g’s value, with ξ = A˙/A > 0, the above already implies
that in BGSS:
1. The ratios of human capital to income and to physical capital,
h/y and h/k (or equivalently H/Y and H/K), converge to zero;
2. Human capital must become increasingly costly to produce from
IH .
Thus, even with human capital mattering critically for growth, it will
trend neither with income nor capital: In this model the failure to
ﬁnd a stable cointegrating relationship between human capital and
income is evidence for rather than against the importance of human
capital in growth.
To understand the second implication, suppose it failed and in-
stead a counterpart to equation (19) held:
˙˜




h/h˜+ [ν + ξ + δH ]
)
h˜.
Since f is HD1, BGSS has
y˜ = f(k˜, h) =⇒ h˙/h = ˙˜y/y˜ = ˙˜k/k˜ = g − ξ,
so that
˙˜
h/h˜ = h˙/h− ξ = g − 2ξ.







h˙/h+ [ν + ξ + δH ]
)
h˜ · q
cannot grow at g − ξ, the growth rate of the left side.
Instead, what is needed is something like
h˙ = iH/A− (ν + δH)h. (20)
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In words, the contribution of iH to h˙ becomes progressively diﬃcult
as A rises.7
From the discussion we have:
Proposition 7.2 If production F is (PF0) then BGSS has
h˙/h = y˙/y = ξ.
If, however, production F is (PF1) then BGSS has
h˙/h = y˙/y − ξ.
The speciﬁcation above specializes to several well-known cases.
With (PF0), setting q = 1 and H˙ = IH − δHH, and requiring
c˜+ i˜K + i˜H ≤ f(k˜, h˜)
recovers an optimizing version of the model in Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil [1992]. Specifying (PF1) and bounding h˜ gives the model in
Jones [1998, Ch. 3] and Romer [2001, 3.8].
Using (PF1) and ﬁxing q = 1 gives the one-sector growth model
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, 5.1]. Freeing up q but requiring
that for some HD1 (sub) production functions F , G and allocation
shares sK , sH ∈ [0, 1] we have:
F (K,HA) = F(sKK, sHHA)
+ q · G([1− sK ]K, [1 − sH ]HA)






[1− sK ]K, [1 − sH ]HA
)
gives the model in Rebelo [1991]. As before call the partial derivatives
FK , FH , and so on. Then, restricting further GK = 0 gives the Lucas
model. Since this case bears speciﬁc interest, the discussion below
will take care to account for it with sK = 1 at the corner optimum.
Hereafter, consider the following:
7 Alternatively, the deﬁnition of BGSS in Defn. 7.1 to require
invariant q can be modiﬁed appropriately.
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Definition 7.3 Assume production is given by (PF1) and human
capital accumulation by (20). Suppose the economy solves the social
welfare optimization program:
sup




s.t. c˜, i˜K , i˜H , q ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ sK , sH ≤ 1
˙˜k = i˜K − ζK k˜ (22)
h˙ = i˜H − (ν + δH)h (23)
c˜+ i˜K + qi˜H ≤ f(k˜, h) = y˜ (24)








q = 1. (26b)
A BGSS equilibrium is a BGSS together with pair (sK , sH) invariant
in time solving (21)–(26).
When (26a) holds, (24) and (25) imply





i.e., the technology for producing IH diﬀers from that for producing
C+IK . Call C+IK goods, so that F and G describe goods production
and human capital production respectively.
To analyze equilibrium deﬁne for non-negative Lagrange multipli-
ers
(mK ,mH ,mC ,mY ,mI ,mq)
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+ (˜iK − ζK k˜)mK + (˜iH − (ν + δH)h)mH
−
(





f(k˜, h) −F(sK k˜, sHh)











The ﬁrst-order conditions at an optimum are:
∂H
∂c˜
= 0 =⇒ AU ′ −mC = 0 (27)
∂H
∂i˜K
= 0 =⇒ mK −mC = 0 (28)
∂H
∂i˜H
= 0 =⇒ mH − (q ·mC +mI) = 0 (29)
∂H
∂sK
 0 =⇒ FK ·mY − (q ·mY +mI)GK  0 (30)
∂H
∂sH
 0 =⇒ FH ·mY − (q ·mY +mI)GH  0 (31)
∂H
∂q









=⇒ fK ·mC + (1− sK)GK ·mI − ζK ·mK
− (fK − sK · FK − q[1− sK ]GK)mY
= [(ρ− ν)− m˙K/mK ]mK (33)
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=⇒ fH ·mC + (1− sH)GH ·mI − (ν + δH) ·mH
− (fH − sH · FH − q[1− sH ]GH)mY
= [(ρ− ν)− m˙H/mH ]mH . (34)
Conditions (30) and (31) work in the obvious way if it is optimal to set
sK or sH to their boundary values at either 0 or 1. For instance, in the
Lucas case, GK = 0 so that share sK is optimally set to 1 whereupon
(30) becomes the inequality FK ·mY > (q ·mY +mI)GK . Related,
when q is not restricted to 1, equation (32) fails and so provides no
additional restriction in the solution. Finally, conditions (27)–(29)
have been stated as equalities rather than more generally because all
equilibria of interest below will have c˜, i˜K , and i˜H positive.
In these ﬁrst-order conditions the price q only ever appears to-
gether with the Lagrange multiplier mI . When q is not restricted
to 1 (as in (26b)), the pair (q,mI) are then determined only jointly,
not individually. This implies that the level of measured output y in
(24)–(25) is indeterminate as well, although its growth rate might be
uniquely tied down. We will see this in 7.4b. below. The economics is
straightforward: When (26a) is activated the economy physically can-
not instantaneously transform resources between goods and human
capital. A range of possible prices q can then be consistent with the
observed outcomes in goods and human capital production. Put an-
other way, agents’ decisions are optimally at a corner solution. Then,
up to limits, the Lagrange multiplier mI on (26a) moves appropri-
ately to compensate for alternative settings of q. As the market price
q varies, again up to limits, optimal decisions remain unaltered, with
mI transparently adjusting to maintain equilibrium. Being only a
shadow value, mI is invisible to GDP accounting, whereas q appears
explicitly. Setting q to zero recovers what Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[1995, Ch.5] call “narrow output”; setting q to its maximum value
within the feasible range, “broad output”.
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7.4a. Identical technologies for human capital and goods
When i˜H is freely interchangeable with c and i˜K , set mI = mY =
0 and mq > 0. Then conditions (30)–(31) are irrelevant and q =
1 so that ﬁrst-order conditions (29), (32), (33), and (34) become
respectively
mH −mC = 0
−i˜H ·mC +mq = 0
fK ·mC − ζK ·mK = [(ρ− ν)− m˙K/mK ]mK
fH ·mC − (ν + δH) ·mH = [(ρ− ν)− m˙H/mH ]mH .
Calling m the common value mC = mK = mH and log-diﬀerentiating
(27) with respect to time, the collection of ﬁrst-order conditions col-
lapses to:
m˙/m = ρ+ δK + ξ − fK = ρ+ δH − fH (35)
˙˜c/c˜ = [(1−R(c˜A))ξ − m˙/m]R(c˜A)−1. (36)
From the HD0 property of fK and fH , equation (35) implies
fH(1, h/k˜)− fK(1, h/k˜) = (δH − δK)− ξ (37)
so that h/k˜ is constant in time,8 depending only on δH , δK , ξ, and f .
Signiﬁcantly, (37) holds everywhere in equilibrium, not only in
BGSS. Thus, the model does not in general admit an equilibrium—
BGSS or otherwise—with arbitrary initial conditions in K and H.
At arbitrary initial levels of physical and human capital the implied
marginal products need not line up as required in (37). In this model
physical and human capital can change only gradually, and so can-
not be instantaneously adjusted to meet marginal productivity con-
ditions. But when (37) does hold at a particular value of h/k˜ then
equation (35) gives m˙/m, which in turn determines ˙˜c/c˜ through (36).
8 When δH − δK = ξ = 0 and f(k˜, h) = k˜αh1−α, then (37) gives
h/k˜ = (1 − α)−1α. This special case is, however, neither more in-
sightful nor easier to obtain than the general case considered in the
text of this paper. More important, it is strictly misleading in hiding
the dependence of equilibrium h/k˜ on model parameters.
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That this gives the growth rate of the economy overall is shown in
the following Proposition, which also summarizes the discussion thus
far and provides further details:
Proposition 7.4 Assume in Defn. 7.3 that i˜H is freely interchange-
able with c and i˜K . Suppose that R(c˜A) is constant and f satisﬁes
∀ﬁxed h: fK(k˜, h)→ 0 as k˜ →∞,
fK(k˜, h)→∞ as k˜ → 0,
fKK < 0,
∀ﬁxed k˜: fH(k˜, h) > (δH − δK)− ξ uniformly in h on
a neighborhood of zero,
and fHH ≤ 0.
Then, for any given initial value k˜∗ > 0, BGSS equilibrium exists and
is unique, with the ratio h/k˜ taking a value h∗ constant in time and
independent of k˜∗. The BGSS growth rate is
g = [fK(1, h∗)− (ρ+ δK)]R−1
= [(fH(1, h∗) + ξ)− (ρ+ δH)]R−1,
(G1)
bounded from above by the average product of K in producing goods
(C + IK) net of per capita depreciation. If ξ > 0 then the ratios of
human capital to income and to physical capital converge to zero.
Proof By the assumptions on f , the left side of equation (37),
fH−fK , exceeds its right side at h/k˜ = 0 and strictly declines mono-
tonically without bound. Thus (37) admits a unique positive ﬁnite
solution h∗ in h/k˜. Using h∗ in (35) and plugging the result into (36)
gives the growth rate ˙˜c/c˜, varying with h/k˜ but not k˜ itself. The
deﬁnition of BGSS then gives
˙˜y/y˜ = ˙˜k/k˜ = ˙˜c/c˜ = [(1−R)ξ − m˙/m]R
= [(1−R)ξ − (ρ+ δK + ξ − fK(1, h∗)]R
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Moreover, h/k˜ constant implies also h˙/h = ˙˜k/k˜ = ˙˜c/c˜. Then
g = y˙/y = ˙˜y/y˜ + ξ = ˙˜c/c˜+ ξ
= [(1−R)ξ − m˙/m]R−1 + ξ = [ξ − m˙/m]R−1
= [fK(1, h∗)− (ρ+ δK)]R−1
= [(fH(1, h∗) + ξ)− (ρ+ δH)]R−1,
from (35)
verifying (G1). Since ˙˜k/k˜ = g − ξ in BGSS, we also have k˜(t) =








h˙/h+ (ν + δH)
)
h,
so that (k˜, h∗) then determine the other endogenous variables:
i˜H =
(








c˜ = f(1, h∗)k˜ − i˜H − i˜K
y˜ = f(1, h∗)k˜
m = mK = mH = mC = AU ′(c˜A)
mq = i˜H ×m and q = 1.
Deﬁne c
def= c˜/k˜. In BGSS equilibrium c˙/c = ˙˜c/c˜ − ˙˜k/k˜ = 0 so that,
from (22), (23), (24), and ˙˜k/k˜ = g − ξ, we have:
c = f(1, h∗)− ζK −
(
h˙/h+ [ν + δH ]
)









− (ν + δK)− g.
Since m < ∞ so that (27) gives c > 0, the expression on the right
must be positive. The term in braces is the average product of K in
producing C + IK . Net of per capita depreciation, i.e., taking away
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ν + δK , this average product must therefore exceed growth rate g.
Finally, for ξ > 0,
h˙/h = ˙˜y/y˜ = y˙/y − ξ < y˙/y = k˙/k
=⇒ h/y, h/k → 0 as t→∞.
Q.E.D.
The hypotheses on f as stated in Prop. 7.4 might appear unusual,
but are implied by the usual strict concavity and Inada conditions.
The statement gives an explicit lower bound on fH that might well be
negative, whereupon the condition is redundant. I have chosen to give
the hypotheses as above to allow for situations in the literature that
violate standard assumptions but cause no diﬃculties otherwise. A
prominent example would be where the technology for accumulating
H is linear [e.g., Lucas, 1988].
BGSS equilibrium growth rate (G1) has interesting features that
should be emphasized:
Proposition 7.5 Under the hypotheses of Prop. 7.4 the steady-state
growth rate g exceeds technology’s growth rate ξ precisely when
fK(1, h∗) > Rξ + ρ+ δK
⇐⇒ fH(1, h∗) > (R − 1)ξ + ρ+ δH .
Proof Immediate from (G1). Q.E.D.
The economy’s growth rate (G1) exceeds that of technology when the
equilibrium steady state capital ratio h∗ implies marginal products
fK and fH suﬃciently high. The threshold for these marginal prod-
ucts depends, notably, on both the production side (ξ, δK , δH) and
the consumer side (ρ,R). Moreover, when the threshold is exceeded,
the equilibrium growth rate itself depends, again, on both produc-
tion features (f, ξ, δK , δH) and consumer characteristics (ρ,R). This
contrasts with equilibrium growth rates in sections 7.2 and 7.3, that
vary only with technology, i.e., just with ξ. In the longer term, it
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might be this—rather than convergence or divergence, scale eﬀects,
stochastic trends, or a range of others—that turns out to be the single
most distinctive characterization of endogenous growth. Emphasize
this—it will appear again below—as follows:
Corollary 7.6 (Endogenous Growth Meta) Growth varies with
not only supply-side properties but demand-side features as well.
Finally, also worth observing is that here population growth ν has
no inﬂuence on the per capita income growth rate g. This ﬁnding,
however, is quite special and easily overturned, despite the relatively
general speciﬁcation of the model above.
7.4b. Diﬀerent technologies for human capital and goods
The setup here makes straightforward extending the discussion to
where human capital investment diﬀers in essential ways from con-
sumption and physical capital investment. This is the case considered
in Lucas [1988], Rebelo [1991], and Uzawa [1965].
Numerous special cases are possible. To keep things manageable
I rule out sK = 0 and sH = 1, i.e., where no K is used in F for pro-
ducing goods and no H is used in G for generating human capital.9
Taken together those possibilities represent the extreme version of
what Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] call empirically irrelevant “re-
versed factor intensities.” Ruling out sK = 0 and sH = 1 simply
formalizes two properties: ﬁrst, some physical capital is always nec-
essary in goods production and second, it is not possible to produce
new human capital without some human capital to begin. Indeed,
human capital is most of what goes into producing yet more human
capital. A leading case of interest, which implies the exclusion, is
Lucas’s, which assumes GK = 0 and FH > 0 everywhere, so that in
equilibrium sK = 1 and sH ∈ (0, 1).
9 This exclusion will be used below in (33′) and (34′). Given the
current setup, an interested reader can easily see the implications of
relaxing the restriction.
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Next, sH = 0 can also be excluded. That boundary value would
imply that human capital is not used in producing goods. But then
it cannot be optimal to continue to produce any human capital at
all in equilibrium, for human capital is neither consumed nor used in
producing anything except itself. Thus, in the analysis to follow, the
ﬁrst-order condition (31) is strengthened to an equality.
Suppose that (26a) constrains i˜H to G while q is unrestricted so
that mq = 0. Then (32) gives mC = mY . Equation (25) implies:
fK = sK · FK + q × (1− sK)GK
fH = sH · FH + q × (1− sH)GH .
From these and (29), the FOC (33) becomes
sKFK ·mC + (1− sK)GK ·mH − ζK ·mK
= [(ρ− ν)− m˙K/mK ]mK .
If sK = 1 then the left side becomes just FK · mC − ζK · mK . If,
conversely, sK ∈ (0, 1) then (30) holds with equality so that together
with (29) it gives FK ·mC = GK ·mH so that again the left side above
FK ·mC − ζK ·mK . Thus, ruling out sK = 0, using mC = mK from
(28) gives for the above:
FK − ζK = (ρ− ν)− m˙C/mC . (33′)
Again, by the partial derivatives of (25), the FOC (34) becomes
sHFH ·mC + (1− sH)GH ·mH − (ν + δH) ·mH
= [(ρ− ν)− m˙H/mH ]mH ,
so that ruling out sH = 1, analogous reasoning to that above gives
GH − (ν + δH) = (ρ− ν)− m˙H/mH . (34′)
(Counterparts to (33′)–(34′) are easily obtained if exclusion restric-
tions sK 
= 0 and sH 
= 1 are reversed.)
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Deﬁne
m
def= mH/mC , c
def= c˜/k˜, h def= h/k˜.
Now collect three dynamic equations for the just-deﬁned m, c, and
h. First, combining (33′) and (34′) gives:
m˙/m = m˙H/mH − m˙C/mC
= δH − δK − ξ + FK − GH , (38)
where, because FK and GH are each HD0, sK 
= 0, and sH 
= 1, we












respectively. The reason for taking FK and GH at these points will
become clear below.
Second, as earlier, log-diﬀerentiate (27) with respect to time to
get
˙˜c/c˜ = [(1−R(c˜A))ξ − m˙C/mC ]R(c˜A)−1.
Combining this with m˙C/mC from (33′) and recognizing
˙˜k/k˜ = i˜K/k˜ − ζK = F
(










(where I have used F HD1) gives
c˙/c = ˙˜c/c˜− ˙˜k/k˜
= (ν + δK)− (ρ+ δK)R(c˜A)−1
+ c+R(c˜A)−1FK − sK · F (39)
with both FK and F evaluated at (1, sH · sK−1h).
The term sK ·F will play a key role in subsequent discussion. Since
F(1, sH · sK−1h) is the output-physical capital ratio in the C + IK
–46–
Technology and Growth: Lessons for the New Economy
sector (or physical capital’s average product in producing goods),
the product sK · F is the ratio of goods produced to the economy-
wide quantity of physical capital, not just the quantity used in goods








or the ratio of the ﬂow of new human capital to the economy-wide
stock of human capital, will be similarly useful in the analysis below.
Return now to the third of the dynamic equations. Using G HD1,
we have







− (ν + δH)
so that
h˙/h = h˙/h− ˙˜k/k˜
= δK − δH + ξ + c+ (1− sH) · G − sK · F . (40)
Equation (40) combines together c, G, and F without using prices.
This causes no problems, however, as by this point these terms are
all simply numbers—they are ratios of the appropriate quantities.
Provided R is constant the three equations, (38)–(40), together




m = FK · G−1K or
sK = 1
(41)
m = FH · GH (42)
all F ,FK ,FH evaluated at (1, sHs−1K ·h) and all G,GK ,GH evaluated at
([1−sK ][1−sH ]−1 ·h−1, 1), give ﬁve conditions that jointly determine
(m, c, h, sK , sH). The reason is now apparent for the evaluation point
given right after equation (38).
–47–
Technology and Growth: Lessons for the New Economy
Growth behavior here parallels Prop. 7.4. However, the more in-
volved nonlinear equations (38)–(41) make less transparent existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium, in contrast to the single equation
(37) needed above. Special cases assuming explicit functional forms
for (F ,G)—e.g, the Cobb-Douglas pair model in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin [1995, 5.2] and Rebelo [1991] or the Cobb-Douglas/linear
model in Lucas [1988]—can be studied from the algebra of (38)–
(41) directly.10 The proposition that follows therefore hypothesizes
a unique solution to these equations, leaving unspeciﬁed the more
primitive assumptions on (F ,G) that would transform the hypothesis
into a conclusion. Nevertheless, some work remains to conﬁrm that
this solution is a BGSS equilibrium.
Proposition 7.7 Assume in Defn. 7.3 that R(c˜A) is constant and
that human capital accumulates through a production function G
diﬀerent from F (that for producing goods). Assume (F ,G) implies
that equations (41) and (42) together with the zeroes of equations
(38)–(40) have a unique solution (m∗, c∗, h∗, s∗K , s
∗
H), where sK 
=
0 and sH 
= 1. Then, for any given initial value k˜∗ > 0, BGSS
equilibrium exists and—except in (y, q)—is unique. It is characterized
by a (m∗, c∗, h∗, s∗K , s
∗
H) constant in time and independent of k˜
∗, with
the equilibrium nonuniqueness given as:
q ∈ [0,m∗] and y˜ = F + q · G ∈ [F ,F +m∗ · G] .
The BGSS equilibrium growth rate is
g = [FK − (ρ+ δK)]R−1 = [(GH + ξ)− (ρ+ δH)]R−1, (G2)
bounded from above by the goods-physical capital ratio net of per
capita depreciation. If ξ > 0 then the ratios of human capital to
income and to physical capital converge to zero.
10 As an exercise, the interested reader is encouraged to plug in spe-
ciﬁc functional forms and conﬁrm that the resulting solutions verify
equilibria previously obtained in the literature. See also the discus-
sion at the end of this section.
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Proof By the hypotheses, (26a) is satisﬁed with equality and q is de-
termined endogenously in equilibrium, so that (26b) no longer holds.
In BGSS equilibrium, HD1 in production function (PF1), Prop. 7.2,
and (42) give m constant and therefore m˙ = c˙ = h˙ = 0. Therefore,
BGSS equilibrium has (38)–(40) become
sK · F − c− (1− sH) · G = ξ + δK − δH (43)
sK · F − c−R−1FK = (ν + δK)− (ρ+ δK)R−1 (44)
FK − GH = ξ + δK − δH . (45)
By hypothesis, these together with (41)–(42) admit a solution
(m∗, c∗, h∗, s∗K , s
∗
H).
This allows us to evaluate:
m˙C/mC = (ρ− ν)− (FK − ζK)






By BGSS Defn. 7.1
˙˜y/y˜ = ˙˜k/k˜ = ˙˜c/c˜
so that
g = y˙/y = ˙˜c/c˜+ ξ
= [FK − (ρ+ δK)]R−1 = [(GH + ξ)− (ρ+ δH)]R−1,
verifying (G2). In BGSS, either Prop. 7.2 or h∗ constancy gives
h˙/h = ˙˜k/k˜ = g−ξ. From any initial k˜∗ we then have k˜(t) = k˜∗e(g−ξ)t.
To see this establishes an equilibrium, calculate
i˜H =
(








c˜ = c∗k˜ = F (sK , sHh∗) k˜ − i˜K
mY = mK = mC = AU ′(c˜A)
mH = m∗ ×mC .
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The solution (m∗, c∗, h∗, s∗K , s
∗
H) and an initial k˜
∗ uniquely determine
the endogenous variables above. However, not so for (mI , q, y˜) indi-
vidually. Instead, from (24), (25), and (29), we have
mI = mH − q ·mC = (m∗ − q) ·mC
y˜ = F (s∗K , s∗H · h∗) k˜ + q · G ([1− s∗K ]/h∗, 1− s∗H)h∗k˜
so that any constant q ∈ [0,m∗] implies an mI such that
0 ≤ mI ≤ m∗mC = mH ,
and a y = Ay˜ that together with the above constitutes a BGSS equi-
librium. Next, (39) gives
c = sKF −R−1FK −
[
(ν + δK)− (ρ+ δK)R−1
]
= sKF − (ν + δK)− [FK − (ρ+ δK)]R−1
= [sKF − (ν + δK)]− g.
The term in brackets is the goods-physical capital ratio net of per
capita depreciation. Since m < ∞ so that (27) gives c > 0, the ex-
pression on the right must be positive: The growth rate g is bounded
from above by the net of per capita depreciation goods-physical capi-
tal ratio. Finally, for completeness, reproduce the previous argument
that for ξ > 0,
h˙/h = ˙˜y/y˜ = y˙/y − ξ < y˙/y = k˙/k
=⇒ h/y, h/k → 0 as t→∞.
Q.E.D.
Is there intuition for the indeterminacy in (q, y˜)? Recall from (24)–
(25) in Defn. 7.3 that q is a relative price. It serves two functions:
First, q accounts for what is immediately added to national income
by human capital accumulation. Second, q is a market signal to allo-
cate resources between producing goods and producing human cap-
ital. When technologies F and G diﬀer and restriction (26a) holds,
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the equilibrium production decision is a corner solution: goods and
human capital cannot be transformed into each other—not just cost-
lessly, but at all. The relative price that decentralizes this allocation
decision is determined only up to an appropriate range. All prices
within that range imply the same observed outcome in quantities;
the slack is taken up by some shadow value, in this case, the La-
grange multiplier mI . But then using q in national income accounts
leads similarly to a range of possible values for GDP. When q is set
to zero, GDP fails to include human capital accumulation and is then
what Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch. 5] call “narrow output”.
Conversely, at the maximum feasible equilibrium value for q, namely
m∗ = FH · G−1H (corresponding to equation (5.16) in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin [1995]), GDP evaluates to what Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[1995, Ch. 5] call “broad output”. The analysis above, however, sug-
gests that any level of GDP between narrow and broad output is
equally meaningful. All of them grow at the same rate in BGSS equi-
librium; all of them imply an identical value to the program (21)–(26).
As earlier, the BGSS equilibrium growth rate has interesting fea-
tures:
Proposition 7.8 Under the hypotheses of Prop. 7.7 the steady-state
growth rate g exceeds technology’s growth rate ξ precisely when
FK(s∗K , s∗H · h∗) > Rξ + ρ+ δK
⇐⇒ GH([1− s∗K ]/h∗, 1− s∗H) > (R − 1)ξ + ρ+ δH .
Proof Immediate from (G2). Q.E.D.
The equilibrium growth rate (G2) resembles (G1) in the earlier dis-
cussion. For the economy’s growth rate to exceed that of technology,
the marginal productivity of physical capital in goods production or,
equivalently, the marginal productivity of human capital in generating
new human capital must be suﬃciently high. The critical threshold
depends on both production (ξ, δK , δH) and consumption (ρ,R) char-
acteristics. When the threshold is exceeded, again, the equilibrium
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growth rate depends on both production features (F ,G, ξ, δK , δH) and
consumer characteristics (ρ,R).
Prop. 7.7, as already discussed above, hypothesizes that (F ,G)
implies a unique solution to equations (38)–(42). A reasonable conjec-
ture is that standard Inada-type conditions would deliver this. How-
ever, those curvature conditions would unnecessarily rule out, among
others, the leading case with G linear [Lucas, 1988], and where the
equilibrium can be studied explicitly. To see this, note that, in our
notation, that model has
F
(
sK · k˜, sH · h
)
= (sK · k˜)α(sH · h)1−α, α ∈ (0, 1)
G
(
[1− sK ] · k˜, [1 − sH ] · h
)
= γ × [1− sH ] · h, γ > max{0,−[ξ + δK − δH ]}.



















G = GH = γ and GK = 0.
By the last of these, s∗K = 1 in equation (41). Using this in (45)
determines s∗H · h∗, since γ > −[ξ + δK − δH ] by hypothesis. In turn,
equation (44) then gives c∗, and equation (43), s∗H and h
∗ separately.
Finally, (42) gives m∗. The BGSS equilibrium growth rate is
g = h˙/h+ ξ = γ × (1− s∗H)− (ν + δH) + ξ.
This depends on consumer characteristics through s∗H being deter-
mined in (43)–(45).
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